"Would God Really Ask That?" Wrestling with Divine Commands and Moral Intuition

    This week’s Religious Studies class left me unsettled—in a good way. We revisited the story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22, a passage I’ve heard countless times but never sat with so uncomfortably. The image of a father raising a knife over his son at God’s command is haunting. It’s not just a test of faith—it’s a test of moral boundaries. And it raises a question I can’t shake: What kind of God would ask this?

    Our readings pushed that discomfort further. Robert Adams’ article Abraham’s Dilemma and David Baggett’s chapter titled “Abhorrent Commands,” both confront the tension between Divine Command Theory and moral intuition. Baggett doesn’t shy away from the hardest questions—like whether a good God could command genocide or child sacrifice. He argues that while scripture must be taken seriously, not every command attributed to God reflects His true nature. A perfectly good God, Baggett insists, would never issue a truly abhorrent command. His version of Divine Command Theory is principled, not blind.

    For the weekly assignment, I was asked to summarize David Baggett's key point in 250-300 words. Below is my reply:

Chapter 7, titled Abhorrent Commands, explores one of the most challenging objections to Divine Command Theory: the possibility that God could command something morally abhorrent, such as genocide, as found in the book of Joshua or child sacrifice. David Baggett engages with troubling biblical passages like the Binding of Isaac as found in Genesis 22 and the Conquest Narratives found in the Old Testament, which seem to depict God commanding actions that conflict with our deepest moral intuition. Rather than dismissing these texts as non-literal or irrelevant, Baggett argues that they must be taken seriously and interpreted within a broader theological and moral framework. He acknowledges that some divine commands, if taken at face value, appear incompatible with the nature of a perfectly good God. However, he maintains that God’s commands are not arbitrary; they are grounded in His inherently good nature, which places moral limits on what God could command. Baggett encourages readers to draw a principled line between difficult biblical passages that challenge our understanding but may be reconcilable, and truly abhorrent scenarios that a good God could never endorse. This approach allows for a nuanced version of Divine Command Theory – one that respects both scriptural authority and moral intuition. Ultimately, Baggett’s goal is to show that belief in a good God does not require abandoning moral reasoning, but rather invites deeper reflection on how divine commands and moral truths can coexist.

    I don't believe in a divine being, but I do believe in the power of moral reasoning. What these readings and discussions have shown me is that even within religious frameworks, there's room for critical thought and ethical boundaries. The idea that some commands - even if attributed to God - should be questioned is not just a theological concern, but a human one. Whether we view these texts as sacred or historical, they reflect the ongoing struggle to reconcile authority with conscience. And that struggle, I think, is worth engaging with - regardless of belief.

Sources: 

Adams, R. M. (2003). Abraham’s dilemma. In Finite and infinite goods: A framework for ethics (pp. 277-291). Oxford University Press.

Baggett, D., & Walls, J. L. (2011). Abhorrent commands. In Good God: The theistic foundations of morality (pp. 125–142). Oxford University Press.

[Written for PHIL 366R class UVU Fall 2025]
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