Showing posts with label Religious Studies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Religious Studies. Show all posts

Friday, October 17, 2025

Four Questions, Four Essays: A Test of Thought in Religion and Violence

I had my first test in my Religion, Violence, and Peacebuilding class, and it wasn’t about memorizing facts — it was about thinking deeply. We were given four short essay questions, each asking us to engage with complex ideas from the readings and discussions so far. Each response was around 200 to 300 words, and together they formed a kind of intellectual checkpoint: What have I learned? What do I still wrestle with?

The first question: According to Philip Jenkins, how has the conquest of Canaan narrative shaped Christian and Jewish approaches to divinely sanctioned violence? (Answer in 200-250 words) Philip Jenkins’ work helped me see how scripture has been used to justify violence—and how those justifications evolve across history and context. Below is my short reply of 221 words:

Philip Jenkins argues that the biblical conquest of Canaan – especially in the Book of Joshua – has profoundly shaped Jewish and Christian views of divinely sanctioned violence. The narrative, in which God commands the Israelites to destroy entire populations, has historically been used to justify violence under the banner of divine will. From the crusades to colonial expansion, this story has served as a theological framework for portraying conquest and extermination as righteous acts. Yet Jenkins highlights the discomfort this narrative provokes, prompting many interpretations to spiritualize or allegorize the violence. It’s continued presence in liturgy and scripture forces religious communities to grapple with the moral implications of sacred texts. This story illustrates how scripture can inspire faith while also legitimizing violence. Figures like R.A. Torrey, founder of American Fundamentalism, interpreted the slaughter of the Canaanites as a necessary act: “The Canaanites had become a moral cancer threatening the very life of the whole human race… Cutting out a cancer is a delicate operation, but often it is the kindest thing a surgeon can do… The kindest thing that God could do… was to cut out every root and fiber of these grossly wicked people.” Jenkins’s analysis challenges us to consider how religious communities interpret difficult texts and whether sacred violence can ever be reconciled with modern ethical commitments.

The second: Why was the execution of Michael Servetus a key event in the development of debates over religious toleration? (Answer in 200-250 words) I explored how his death exposed the limits of Reformation-era freedom and sparked debates that still echo today. Below is my short reply of 240 words:

The execution of Michael Servetus in 1553 was a pivotal moment in the history of religious toleration, exposing the limits of reform-era pluralism. Condemned for heresy by both Catholic and Protestant authorities, Servetus was ultimately burned at the stake in Geneva under John Calvin’s leadership. His death revealed that even within emerging Protestant movements, dissenting theological views were not tolerated. The brutality of his execution sparked widespread debate, especially among thinkers like Sebastian Castellio, who famously wrote, “To kill a man is not to defend a doctrine, but to kill a man.” Castellio’s writings laid early groundwork for the idea that religious disagreement should not be met with violence, arguing that coercion in matters of faith contradicted the teachings of Christ. In contrast, John Calvin defended Servetus’s execution, stating, “Is it reasonable that heretics should murder and poison souls with their false doctrines, and the sword ordained by God be prevented from touching their bodies, and the whole body of Christ be lacerated so that stench of one rotten member should be untouched?” Calvin’s view reflected a broader belief that heresy endangered not just theology but the moral fabric of society. Servetus’s fate became a symbol of the dangers of dogmatism and the urgent need for freedom of conscience. His death catalyzed broader discussions about the moral and political necessity of religious tolerance, challenging future generations to reconcile faith with human rights and ethical pluralism.

The third: What are the key areas of agreement and disagreement between free will theism and process theism on the question of the problem of evil? (Answer in 200-250 words) I found this one especially interesting—two theological frameworks, both trying to reconcile suffering with divine power, yet diverging on how much control God actually has. Below is my short reply of 200 words:

Free will theism and process theism both reject the notion that God unilaterally determines all events, emphasizing that genuine human freedom is essential to understanding the existence of evil. Both perspectives affirm that God does not will evil and that suffering often arises from the misuse of creaturely freedom. However, they diverge significantly in their understanding of divine power. Free will theists maintain that God is omnipotent but voluntarily limits divine control to preserve human freedom. In contrast, process theists argue that God is inherently limited in power and cannot unilaterally prevent evil or override natural processes.

This distinction has profound implications for how each tradition approaches divine responsibility, prayer, and hope for justice. Free will theists believe God could intervene but often chooses not to, while process theists assert that God simply cannot intervene in certain ways. The tension between divine power and the presence of evil is captured in Epicurus’s enduring question: “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”

The final question: How does Cavanaugh understand the religious/secular distinction? How did it come about? (Answer in 250-300 words) His critique of the modern myth of secular neutrality challenged me to rethink how power and violence are framed in supposedly “non-religious” contexts. Below is my short reply of 300 words:

William Cavanaugh argues that the distinction between religious and secular is not a natural or timeless division, but a modern invention rooted in the rise of the nation-state. In his view, this binary was constructed during the early modern period to delegitimize certain forms of belief and consolidate state power. By labeling some forms of violence as religious and others as secular, emerging states could portray themselves as rational, neutral, and peacekeeping, while casting religious actors as irrational and prone to conflict. Cavanaugh challenges the idea that religion is uniquely violent, pointing out that secular ideologies – like nationalism or liberalism – have also fueled massive violence, such as in world wars. He argues that what counts as religion is often defined in contrast to what the state wants to claim as its own domain. This framing allows the state to monopolize legitimate violence while marginalizing alternative sources of moral authority. As Cavanaugh asks, “what becomes of the dividing line between the secular and religious—upon which the whole argument depends—if the secular is a form of religion?” The religious/secular divide, then, is not descriptive but political – it serves to justify certain power structures. Cavanaugh’s critique is central to debates in religion and violence because it questions the assumptions behind how we assign blame and authority. It also invites us to rethink how peacebuilding might look if we move beyond those constructed categories. “The common notion that religion is peculiarly prone to violence depends on the idea that these secular matters have less of a tendency to promote violence; it is commonly assumed that this is so because they have to do with purely mundane affairs. Religion on the other hand, is seen as peculiarly incendiary because it raises the stakes to another level, where reason is trumped by passion.”

Scoring 100% felt great, but more than that, it affirmed that I’m engaging with these ideas in a meaningful way. As an atheist, I’m not here to defend doctrine—I’m here to understand how belief shapes action, especially when it comes to violence and peace. This test reminded me that asking hard questions is just as important as answering them.

Sources: 

Cavanaugh, W. T. (2009). The myth of religious violence: Secular ideology and the roots of modern conflict. Oxford University Press.

Gregory, B. S. (2022). The radical reformation. In P. Marshall (Ed.), The Oxford history of the Reformation (pp. 144–190). Oxford University Press.

Hasker, W. (2000). The problem of evil in process theism and classical free will theism. Process Studies, 29(2), 194–208.

Jenkins, P. (2011). Laying down the sword: Why we can't ignore the Bible's violent verses. HarperOne.

[Written for PHIL 366R class UVU Fall 2025]
aB . All Rights Reserved . 2025

Tuesday, October 14, 2025

"Would God Really Ask That?" Wrestling with Divine Commands and Moral Intuition

    This week’s Religious Studies class left me unsettled—in a good way. We revisited the story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22, a passage I’ve heard countless times but never sat with so uncomfortably. The image of a father raising a knife over his son at God’s command is haunting. It’s not just a test of faith—it’s a test of moral boundaries. And it raises a question I can’t shake: What kind of God would ask this?

    Our readings pushed that discomfort further. Robert Adams’ article Abraham’s Dilemma and David Baggett’s chapter titled “Abhorrent Commands,” both confront the tension between Divine Command Theory and moral intuition. Baggett doesn’t shy away from the hardest questions—like whether a good God could command genocide or child sacrifice. He argues that while scripture must be taken seriously, not every command attributed to God reflects His true nature. A perfectly good God, Baggett insists, would never issue a truly abhorrent command. His version of Divine Command Theory is principled, not blind.

    For the weekly assignment, I was asked to summarize David Baggett's key point in 250-300 words. Below is my reply:

Chapter 7, titled Abhorrent Commands, explores one of the most challenging objections to Divine Command Theory: the possibility that God could command something morally abhorrent, such as genocide, as found in the book of Joshua or child sacrifice. David Baggett engages with troubling biblical passages like the Binding of Isaac as found in Genesis 22 and the Conquest Narratives found in the Old Testament, which seem to depict God commanding actions that conflict with our deepest moral intuition. Rather than dismissing these texts as non-literal or irrelevant, Baggett argues that they must be taken seriously and interpreted within a broader theological and moral framework. He acknowledges that some divine commands, if taken at face value, appear incompatible with the nature of a perfectly good God. However, he maintains that God’s commands are not arbitrary; they are grounded in His inherently good nature, which places moral limits on what God could command. Baggett encourages readers to draw a principled line between difficult biblical passages that challenge our understanding but may be reconcilable, and truly abhorrent scenarios that a good God could never endorse. This approach allows for a nuanced version of Divine Command Theory – one that respects both scriptural authority and moral intuition. Ultimately, Baggett’s goal is to show that belief in a good God does not require abandoning moral reasoning, but rather invites deeper reflection on how divine commands and moral truths can coexist.

    I don't believe in a divine being, but I do believe in the power of moral reasoning. What these readings and discussions have shown me is that even within religious frameworks, there's room for critical thought and ethical boundaries. The idea that some commands - even if attributed to God - should be questioned is not just a theological concern, but a human one. Whether we view these texts as sacred or historical, they reflect the ongoing struggle to reconcile authority with conscience. And that struggle, I think, is worth engaging with - regardless of belief.

Sources: 

Adams, R. M. (2003). Abraham’s dilemma. In Finite and infinite goods: A framework for ethics (pp. 277-291). Oxford University Press.

Baggett, D., & Walls, J. L. (2011). Abhorrent commands. In Good God: The theistic foundations of morality (pp. 125–142). Oxford University Press.

[Written for PHIL 366R class UVU Fall 2025]
aB . All Rights Reserved . 2025

Friday, September 26, 2025

Chaos, Creation, and the Limits of Divine Power

Week 4 in my Religious Studies class felt different as the campus was slowly reopening after last week's tragic event. With no class on Monday, we only had one class day on Wednesday to get all of the readings in. I read The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism by William Hasker and chapter two of The Providence of God by Paul Helm. At the end of the week, I was then asked to read Creation out of Nothing by David Griffin. After reading Griffin, I was asked to first concisely summarize his key points in 200-250 words, and then I was asked how Griffin would respond to William Hasker's central arguments in 250-300 words. Here is my submission for the assignment:

    David Ray Griffin argues that the traditional Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and divine omnipotence make the problem of evil something we cannot solve. He proposes a different theodicy called process theism, that is rooted in the creation out of chaos. Process theism reimagines the nature of God – not as a source of evil, but as a loving and active presence striving to bring about good. Instead of creation out of nothing, God organized the world from pre-existing chaotic matter, which had its own tendencies and freedom. This way evil can exist without making God morally responsible for it. Griffin rejects God as omnipotent in the classical sense and calls his power persuasive, not coercive. He mentions that reality consists of autonomous agents (including humans and other entities) that God influences but cannot control. When it comes to evil, Griffin insists that evil is real and tragic, not illusory or necessary for a greater good. “Genuine” evil are events categorized as things that would be better if they had not occurred. Griffin’s view on divine power is also different as he sees God as perfect in love and wisdom but not all-powerful. He believes that evil arises from the freedom and unpredictability of the world, not from the divine will.

    David Griffin’s views stand in contrast to those of William Hasker, particularly in how each theologian understands divine power and the origin of evil. Griffin identifies as a process theologian and so he rejects the idea of God as omnipotent in the classical sense. He believes that if God had the power to prevent evil but chose not to, then God must not be good. He also believes that the traditional view of free will allows God to intervene which He chooses not to, which Griffin sees as morally problematic. Griffin supports creation out of chaos instead of creation out of nothing. If God created everything from nothing, then God is still responsible for creating beings capable of evil. Creation out of chaos avoids this by stating that freedom and unpredictability are built-in from the start. Hasker argues that natural evils are part of God’s necessary plan, but Griffin sees this as a troubling limitation on divine power. In open theism God created the world from nothing and could have designed it differently and so God is ultimately responsible for the evil that stems from it. In process theism God is part of the process of reality and constantly working to bring about good, but he cannot unilaterally prevent evil. The difference here makes it that God is not morally responsible for evil in the same way that open theism’s God might be.


References:

Griffin, D. R. (2006). Creation out of nothing: A biblical, philosophical, and scientific exploration. Westminster John Knox Press.

Hasker, W. (2000). The problem of evil in process theism and classical free will theism. Process Studies, 29(2), 194–208.

Helm, P. (1994). The providence of God. IVP Academic.


[Written for PHIL 366R class UVU Fall 2025]
aB . All Rights Reserved . 2025

Thursday, September 25, 2025

From Classroom to Crisis: The Unthinkable After the Lecture

In week 3 of my Religious Studies class, we read chapter 1 of Divided by Faith by Benjamin J. Kaplan and chapter 2 of Jihad and the Struggle for Islam by John Esposito. After class on Wednesday, September 10, our University was shut down and classes were cancelled as tragedy struck and a life was taken too soon. 

The fact that we had been talking about religious intolerance and violence just 25 minutes earlier was surreal and heartbreaking to me. There was no assignment for this week, and no other readings were assigned until the middle of next week to give faculty, staff, and students time to grieve and process what happened on our campus, where safety had now been shattered.

References:

Esposito, J. L. (1996). Jihad and the struggle for Islam. In The religion factor. Westminster John Knox Press.

Kaplan, B. J. (2007). Divided by faith: Religious conflict and the practice of toleration in early modern Europe. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

[Written for PHIL 366R class UVU Fall 2025]
aB . All Rights Reserved . 2025

Wednesday, September 24, 2025

No Swords, No Oaths: The Radical Reformation's Peaceful Protest

With Labor Day falling on one of our class days, week 2 of my Religious Studies class was significantly shorter. We were only assigned to read chapter 9 out of Fields of Blood by Karen Armstrong, and then for the weekly assignment, I read the Schleitheim Confession of 1527, and The Radical Reformation by Brad S. Gregory, which is chapter 4 in the Oxford History of the Reformation. I was then posed three different questions to answer in 500-600 words. Here are the questions:

What was the Radical Reformation? What makes this group distinct in relation to broader Reformation movements? Why is the Schleitheim Confession important in understanding core themes in our class?

Here is my assignment submission that answers those three questions:

    The Reformation started in the early 16th century when key figures like Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Huldrych Zwingli challenged practices within the Catholic Church that they believed needed reform. While many traditions remained, their critiques led to the formation of new denominations such as Lutheranism and Calvinism, which emphasized that salvation comes through faith in Christ alone and that the Bible is the sole source of religious truth.

    However, other reformers diverged from this mainstream movement to push for even deeper changes. These leaders sought to create a completely new, purified church based solely on New Testament teachings, rejecting any involvement with the state. Thomas Muntzer, Menno Simons, and other Anabaptist leaders rejected infant baptism in favor of adult baptism, believing faith must be a personal and conscious decision. Their beliefs were considered radical and heretical by both Catholics and mainstream Protestants.

    One of the most important documents outlining Anabaptist beliefs is the Schleitheim Confession (1527), written during a time of persecution and theological confusion. It clarified their core principles so others could understand their distinct approach to Christianity.

1. They believe that only adults need to be baptized, and only those who choose it.
2. Members of their church who sin need to be corrected with love. If they don’t change then they should be excluded from the community only after repeated warnings.
3. Only those who are part of the community (baptized adults) should have communion as it is a symbol of unity and commitment to Christ.
4. Good Christians should live differently than the rest of society. They should avoid things that go against God’s teachings, including corrupt politics and false religion.
5. Pastors are chosen by the church and should live a simple life. Their role is to teach, guide, and care for the church. It is not to seek power or wealth.
6. Christians should not use violence or serve in the military. Christians believe in peace and following Jesus’ example of love and forgiveness.
7. Christians should not swear any oaths. They should always speak truthfully, so oaths are never necessary.

    Anabaptists were considered radical because they went far beyond the reforms proposed by Luther and Calvin. They challenged long-standing religious traditions, especially baptism, and redefined them. Unlike Lutherans and Calvinists, Anabaptists believed the church should be entirely separate from political power. They refused to swear oaths of allegiance or serve in government roles, which meant they received no political support.

    In a time when religion and warfare were deeply intertwined, most Anabaptists were strict pacifists, refusing to bear arms, participate in war, or use violence – even in self-defense. Their commitment to peace and voluntary faith made them targets of persecution from both Catholic and Protestant authorities.

    The Reformation had unintended consequences that led to deep divisions. While Martin Luther aimed to correct major problems within the Catholic Church, he did not intend for religion to lose its public role. However, once people began interpreting the Bible for themselves, disagreements multiplied. Many Protestant groups claimed to have the “correct interpretation,” leading to religious conflict and political instability.

    As religion and violence increasingly affected society, the need for tolerance became clear. People could not be forced to believe the same way. To stop the fighting, freedom of religion became essential. Over time, this led to the idea that religion should be less central to public life, paving the way for secularization.


References:

Armstrong, K. (2014). The arrival of religion. In Fields of blood: Religion and the history of violence. Alfred A. Knopf.

Gregory, B. S. (2022). The radical reformation. In P. Marshall (Ed.), The Oxford history of the Reformation (pp. 144–190). Oxford University Press.

Sattler, M. (1527). The Schleitheim Confession. Swiss Brethren Conference. (Original work translated by J. C. Wenger, 1945)


[Written for PHIL 366R class UVU Fall 2025]
aB . All Rights Reserved . 2025

Tuesday, September 23, 2025

Love Thy Neighbor... or Smite Them?

I am taking a Religious Studies class this semester titled Religion, Violence, and Peacebuilding. In week 1, we began by reading the introduction to Laying Down the Sword by Philip Jenkins and a section in the Cambridge Companion to Religion and War titled Christian Crusading, Ritual, and Liturgy by M. Cecilia Gaposchkin. Then our assignment for the week was to read the introduction to The Sacred Fury by Charles Selengut and concisely summarize the key points in that particular work in 300-350 words. Here is my submission for that assignment:

    Charles Selengut explains that religion is meant to promote compassion, forgiveness, peace, love, and especially non-violence. Many scriptural passages condemn violence, yet the same texts also contain accounts of violent confrontations, divine commands for holy war, and other troubling acts. These contradictions create tension for believers navigating faith and morality.

    Selengut references Emile Durkheim, noting that religious commitment is often rooted in sacred truths believed to be divinely ordained. Followers may feel obligated to obey—even when commands seem irrational—because they trust in the source. Religion also promises rewards in the afterlife for obedience and discourages questioning.

    Religious institutions aim to provide social order, structure, and meaning, offering explanations for suffering and hope for redemption. However, leaders can exploit this structure to justify violence. Defining religious violence is complex; it includes not only physical harm but also psychological and symbolic injury. Selengut broadens the definition to include actions—verbal, written, or physical—that cause or threaten harm.

    The book explores five perspectives on religious violence. First, it examines how scriptures justify violence through divine command, as seen in the Crusades, Jihad, and the story of Joshua. Second, it looks at how violence can fulfill emotional or social needs, creating unity or moral justification. Third, it considers violence as a strategic response by groups who feel threatened or erased, using it to defend identity and mobilize support. The fourth perspective addresses apocalyptic violence, where perpetrators believe they are participating in a final battle between good and evil, seeking purification or salvation. The fifth explores sexual violence, focusing on the power religious institutions hold over members.

    Selengut concludes by urging readers not to stereotype religions as inherently violent or peaceful. He warns against simplistic generalizations, such as Islam being a warrior religion or Christianity being peaceful. All religions contain elements of both peace and violence. To understand religious violence, we must remain open-minded, informed, and neutral.

References:

Gaposchkin, M. C. (2023). Christian crusading, ritual, and liturgy. In M. Kitts (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Religion and War (pp. 385–401). Cambridge University Press.

Jenkins, P. (2011). Laying down the sword: Why we can't ignore the Bible's violent verses. HarperOne.

Selengut, C. (2008). Sacred fury: Understanding religious violence (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield.


[Written for PHIL 366R class UVU Fall 2025]
aB . All Rights Reserved . 2025